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Abstract The paper examines dividend policy for a sample of Swiss compa-
nies. Several factors that determine cross-sectional variations in dividend policy
– such as profitability, growth opportunities, and riskiness – are identified. Price
volatility seems to stand out as the most significant factor. Looking at the rela-
tionship between dividends and earnings over time, dividend changes are more
closely linked to past and current rather than future net income growth. How-
ever, they do confirm a persistent shift in the level of earnings. There is also
a significant relationship between losses and dividend cuts. These findings sug-
gest that it is the managers’ reluctance to cut dividends that gives informational
content to dividend changes.
Keywords Dividends · Payout policy · Signaling · Expected earnings
JEL Classification Numbers G14 · G35
1 Introduction
In the ideal world of Miller and Modigliani (1961), dividends are irrelevant.
The value of a firm is given by its investment opportunities. Dividends are just
the residual, and investors faced with consumption shocks can always get their
own “homemade” dividends.
In “real life”, however, dividend policy is one of the main concerns for
managers and investors. Empirical studies have generally found that dividend
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increases are considered good news by investors, while dividend decreases lead
to negative reactions.
Several explanations for the existence and importance of dividends have
been suggested over the last decades. Dividends could be used as signals for the
actual position of a firm. Companies could communicate their better quality by
paying higher dividends: low-quality firms will not be able to imitate them since
dividends involve costs in terms of foregone investment, taxes, or the need to
attract external capital. Agency theory suggests that dividends may be a way
to reduce the overinvestment problem or a means to keep firms in the capital
markets. Dividends may also be used to attract institutional investors, who are
bettermonitors and prefer dividends for regulatory reasons. Behavioral aspects,
such as self-control, fairness, or regret aversion, may also be important parts of
the picture.
Each of the main theories concerning dividend policy has found at least
some support in actual data. However, empirical research has also revealed
weaknesses of these explanations, and a broad consensus concerning the “best”
theory of corporate payout seems far away. We may know more about the
“dividend puzzle”, but we are still without a definite solution.
The present paper examines some of the characteristics of dividend policy
using Swiss data. The first part presents factors that influence variations in div-
idend payments across companies at a given point in time. The second part
analyzes the changes in dividends over time.
The cross-sectional analysis for the 2000–2003 period compares the char-
acteristics of dividend payers and non-payers. It then identifies several deter-
minants of the differences between dividend payers in terms of payout ratios
and dividend yields. The results show that companies that are less risky, larger,
with lower growth opportunities, and with lower leverage tend to pay higher
dividends. Institutions show a preference for dividend-paying companies, but
there is little evidence that they prefer higher payout ratios or dividend yields.
Quite interestingly, the factor that turns out to have the strongest influence
on payout ratios and dividend yields is price volatility. This may be interpreted
as a sign that companies with higher earnings uncertainty are less likely to pay
high dividends - or to pay dividends at all.
The second part of the paper then focuses on the relationship between div-
idends and earnings over time. Previous studies suggest that managers may
target either payout ratios or dividends per share; therefore, the paper deals
with both measures.
A first brief section looks at payout ratios. The Lintner model (1956) is found
to perform reasonably well for amajority of companies in the sample. However,
results for other companies are not so good, and very few firms actually declare
they are targeting payout ratios.
Dividends per share aremuchmorewidespread as a headline indicator of div-
idend policy. The final section of the paper looks at changes in (split-adjusted)
dividends per share and seeks to determine whether these changes have infor-
mational content. The results show that dividend increases follow periods of
high earnings and cash flow growth, whereas dividend decreases follow declines.
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A closer look at the data reveals that there may nevertheless be some infor-
mation conveyed by dividend changes. The average future level of earnings
after dividend increases is significantly higher than the mean over the previous
few years. The earnings of companies that decrease the dividend decline slightly
and remain at a persistently low level around the dividend change.
Brav et al. (2004) show that while managers agree that dividends do convey
information to investors, they do not think in terms of academic signaling mod-
els. Based on the results mentioned above, we could formulate an alternative
explanation for the signaling value of dividends. Changes in dividend payments
can be informative due to managers’ reluctance to cut dividends. A dividend
increase can signal management’s confidence that future earnings will settle at
a higher level. A dividend decrease may signal that the management thinks that
earnings have indeed stabilized at a lower level and that the current level of
dividends is no longer sustainable. Thus, dividend changes become informative
not because they are too costly to be imitated by other companies, but because
dividend decreases are costly in terms of managers’ reputation.
Going on to other possible specificities of the Swiss market, it seems that,
perhaps surprisingly, there is no significant connection between ownership con-
centration and dividend yields or payout ratios. Also, the relationship between
dividend policy and firm size is only marginally significant. Thus, if one thinks
of Swiss companies as being grouped into “large”, widely held companies and
smaller, closely held ones, the difference between the two groups in terms of
dividend policy does not seem very clear-cut. One caveat about this conclusion
is, however, that even the smaller companies in the sample are still “large”.
The next section of the paper summarizes some of the alternative theories
concerning dividends as well as previous empirical findings. Section 3 briefly
presents the data, and section 4 identifies some of the sources of cross-sectional
variation in dividend policy. Section 5 examines the relationship between divi-
dends and earnings over time. The partial adjustmentmodel of Lintner (1956) is
applied to a sample of Swiss companies and is found to perform reasonably well
in most cases. Section 5.2 examines the relationship between dividend changes
and earnings in the surrounding years. The evidence seems to support the idea
that managers will increase dividends gradually, while trying to make sure the
increase is sustainable, and that they will avoid cutting dividends unless the
condition of the firm worsens to a significant extent. Section 6 presents the
conclusions of the paper.
2 Motivation and related literature
Dividend policy has long been a subject of research and debate. There aremany
theoretical and empirical results describing the decisions companies make in
this area. At the same time, however, there is no generally accepted model
describing payout policy. Moreover, empirical findings are often contradictory
or difficult to interpret in light of the theory.
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In their seminal paper, Miller and Modigliani (1961) showed that under
certain assumptions (perfect capital markets, rational behavior, and perfect cer-
tainty) dividends are irrelevant; all that matters is the firm’s investment oppor-
tunities. A firmwill always be able to compensate the cash outflow by attracting
new money (via new shares or debt) if its investment program requires this.
In reality, however, people do seem to care about dividends. Lintner’s (1956)
classical study ondividend policy suggests that “dividends represent the primary
and active decision variable in most situations”. His interviews and research
conducted on 28 companies showed that firms set their current dividends based
on their previous history. The main decision concerned the possible change in
the payment rate, and this decision was based on (expected future) earnings.
Dividend policy seemed characterized by “inertia and conservatism”; managers
seemed to think that investors reward stability and avoided making unsustain-
able changes in payout ratios. Based on these findings, Lintner suggested a
model of partial adjustment to a given payout rate.
In a recent study, Brav et al. (2004) find that “maintaining the dividend level
is a priority on par with investment decisions”. Furthermore, less than half of
the executives they interviewed agree that “the availability of good investment
opportunities is an important or very important factor affecting dividend deci-
sions”. Although to a somewhat lesser degree, Lintner’s findings seem valid
almost half a century later.
Researchers have tried to explain the importance of dividends by looking for
“imperfections” that can undermine the irrelevance proposition. Some of the
most important ideas are summarized below.
An important class of models is based on the idea that the assumption of
perfect informationmay be unrealistic and that dividends can be used as signals
of firm quality. Bhattacharya (1979) builds a two-period model with two types
of firms. Investments are made during the first period; their expected profit-
ability is known to management, but not to outside investors. In order to signal
the quality of their investment, the managers of “good” firms (managers are
assumed to act in the interest of initial shareholders) will commit to paying high
dividends in the second period. Since attracting outside financing (during the
second period) is expensive due to transaction costs, “low-quality” firms will
be unable to imitate “high-quality” ones. The alternative models of Miller and
Rock (1985) and John and Williams (1985) consider the cost of dividends in
terms of foregone investments and taxes, respectively.
The signaling models provide an explanation for the positive stock price
reaction to the announcement of dividend increases or initiations. However,
the empirical evidence on this hypothesis is mixed. In an early study, Watts
(1973) found that unexpected changes in earnings and unexpected changes in
dividends were related, although he remained skeptical about the possibility
to make money by exploiting this regularity. Penman (1983) finds that “both
dividend announcements and management’s earnings forecasts possess infor-
mation about management’s expectations”. Using a sample of dividend initi-
ations and omissions, Healy and Palepu (1988) find that dividend initiations
and omissions have informational content (the change in earnings is related to
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announcement-day returns, even when controlling for previous earnings), but
this only holds for year 1. Yoon and Starks (1995) and Denis et al.(1994) show
that dividend change announcements are linked to revisions in analysts’ fore-
casts of current income. Nissim and Ziv (2001) control for mean reversion in
earnings and show that dividend changes areuseful inpredicting future earnings.
On the other hand, DeAngelo et al. (1996) examine the case of companies
that experience the first earnings decline after at least 9 years of sustained earn-
ings growth. They find that more than 60% of managers still increase dividends
in the year earnings decrease. Moreover, dividend changes in year 0 (the year
of the earnings decline) are not related to future unexpected earnings changes.
Benartzi et al. (1997) show that dividend increases are not followed by faster
earnings growth. Grullon et al. (2003) challenge the findings of Nissim and
Ziv (2001). They show that after controlling for the difference in the speed of
adjustment following positive and negative earnings surprises, adding dividend
changes into the model does not improve forecasting performance.
Based on the mixed results for the signaling theory, Grullon et al.(2002) sug-
gest that, rather than an increase in profitability, dividend increases could reflect
a decrease in risk – the “maturity hypothesis”. They find that while profitability
declines following a dividend increase, systematic risk in a three-factor Fama–
French model decreases. They argue that as firms become more mature (and
therefore less risky, but with lower growth opportunities), they will be more
likely to pay large dividends to their shareholders.
Agency theory suggests that dividends can be used as a means to control a
firm’s management. Distributing dividends reduces the free cash flow problem
and increases the management’s equity stake. Easterbrook (1984) also suggests
that dividends can be used to keep firms in capital markets, where they are
monitored by potential investors. This is useful since monitoring by existing
shareholders can be hindered by coordination problems. Lang and Litzenber-
ger (1989) find that dividend increases are associated with higher positive share
price reactions for companies with Tobin’s q smaller than unity, i.e., for compa-
nies with lower growth opportunities.
Another agency problem is that between shareholders and debtholders. The
risk that shareholders will expropriate debtholders by paying themselves exces-
sive dividends has led to the often-encountered covenants restricting dividend
policy in bond contracts. Hadjinicolaou and Kalay (1984) and Maxwell and
Stephens (2003) examine the reaction of stock and bond prices to dividend
announcements. They find that although dividend increases are more favor-
able to shareholders, the overall value of the firm goes up – thus there is an
information effect beside the possible wealth transfer.
Allen et al.(2000) suggest that dividends can be used to attract institutional
investors, who do not pay dividend taxes and have to invest in dividend-paying
companies for regulatory reasons. The firm will benefit from attracting this par-
ticular type of investor since they are better monitors and can trade large blocks
of shares more easily. In an empirical study, Grinstein andMichaely (2005) find
that institutions do choose dividend-paying companies; however, they show no
preference for higher dividend yields.
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Fig. 1 Left average payout ratio; right average dividend yield over the 1986–2003 period for all
available observations in Datastream
Baker andWurgler (2004) put forward a “catering theory” of dividends. They
build a measure indicating investors’ preference for dividends and show that
firms’ dividend policies follow this preference.
To sum up, there are several potential explanations for the existence of div-
idends, although none of them is generally accepted or beyond criticism. The
Miller and Modigliani proposition of dividend irrelevance is still often men-
tioned, as is the idea of a “dividend puzzle”.
3 Data
The paper uses data on listed Swiss companies over the 1974–2004 period.
The main data source is Datastream; annual reports have also been used (for
instance to get information on the main shareholders). Data on repurchases are
taken from Compustat Global Vantage. Foreign companies listed in Switzer-
land have been excluded from the sample. Financial companies and utilities are
also excluded. This is current practice in empirical literature, since it is generally
assumed that the different regulatory environment of these companies could
influence dividend policy. Moreover, in the case of the Swiss sample, a large
proportion of the financial companies with available data are cantonal banks,
which can be considered difficult to compare to purely private, non-financial
companies. As a result, there are 175 non-financial, non-utility companies in the
overall sample. Because of limited data availability, smaller samples are used in
some of the following sections.
Unlike American companies, which pay dividends on a quarterly basis, Swiss
companies usually pay dividends only once a year. (Ex-dividend days are usu-
ally in May or June.) Thus, the analysis in this paper uses yearly observations.
This has the obvious disadvantage of reducing the number of data points. On
the other hand, studies such as Lintner (1956) andDeAngelo et al. (1992) argue
that themain horizon for dividend policy is thewhole year even in theAmerican
case.
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Fig. 2 Left average payout ratio; right average dividend yield for 40 companies with continuous
data over the 1986–2003 period
Figures 1 and 2 present payout ratios and dividend yields over the 1986–2003
period. The mean payout ratio was 30.99%, while the mean dividend yield was
1.96%. Payout ratios had a decreasing trend over the interval – a tendency
that is also reported for the USA (Allen and Michaely 2002; Brav et al. 2004)
as well as other countries (Osobov 2004). Dividend yields did not have any
definite trend; their movement is influenced by both changes in dividends and
movements in share prices.
4 Cross-sectional comparisons of dividend payments
This part of the paper examines the factors that determine variations in div-
idend policy across firms. The comparison is based both on averages for the
2000–2003 period and on data for the single year 2003.
There are several groups of variables that are considered in the cross-sec-
tional comparisons:
– Market-to-book ratios, as a proxy for growth opportunities. Since low mar-
ket-to-book companies are more likely to have free cash flow problems, it
is to be expected that they pay (higher) dividends.
– Total assets and total sales, as proxies for firm size. Large companies are usu-
ally “mature” companies and therefore have more available cash relative to
their positive NPV projects. Moreover, they are more likely to have widely
dispersed shareholdings, and dividends could be used as a way to “keep”
firms “in the capital markets” in order to enhance monitoring. At the same
time, however, large companies are usually considered less informationally
opaque than small companies, and so there may be less need for dividends
as costly signals. Thus, observing the actual connection between firm size
and dividend policy can be interesting.
– The firms’ betas and price volatility (computed as the band within which
the share price moved around the mean price during the year), as measures
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of firm risk. The “maturity hypothesis” suggests that dividend increases are
associated with decreases in risk rather than increases in profitability. Also,
risk is an important firm characteristic in itself, and it is important to control
for it.
– Capital gearing, as a measure of leverage in book terms. Debt covenants
often include limits concerning dividend payments as a way to mitigate the
agency problembetween shareholders and debtholders.On a different level,
both debt and dividends can be used to reduce the free cash flow problem.
Johnson (1995) suggests that debt and dividends could be alternative means
to control management.
– Returns on assets and returns on equity, as measures of firm profitability.
While it may seem obvious that more profitable companies will pay higher
dividends, it is important to control for this measure while examining the
impact of the other factors.
– Several indicators for the ownership structure of these companies. The own-
ership of large Swiss companies is quite varied – from family-owned compa-
nies to widely-held ones, or companies owned by investment funds. Thus, it
is interesting to examine the impact of the ownership structure on dividend
policy.
4.1 Who pays dividends?
There are several features that distinguish firms that pay dividends from firms
that do not. The analysis in this subsection focuses on the 2000–2003 period and
distinguishes between companies that had at least one dividend payment over
the 4 years and companies that had none. Table 1 summarizes some of the main
features of the two groups.
Not surprisingly, companies that paid dividends over the 2000–2003 period
had significantly higher profitability than companies that did not. It is interesting
to note that non-paying companies made losses on average, whereas companies
that paid dividends had positive mean returns on assets and equity.
Non-paying firms had a higher market-to-book ratio. Indeed, agency theory
suggests that companies with better growth opportunities (proxied by the mar-
ket-to-book ratio) are less likely to have free cash flow problems. Therefore,
dividends as an instrument to discipline management are less useful to these
companies. The fact that leverage is virtually identical for the two groups of
companies may mean that dividends and debt are used in different ways to
control management, as suggested by Johnson (1995).
Companies that did not pay dividends over the four years also featured
higher price volatility and higher betas. They also tended to have lower total
assets and lower sales (although the difference is not significant for the latter).
Togetherwith the highermarket-to-book ratio, these differences give support to
the “maturity hypothesis” of Grullon et al. (2002): companies that are younger
and riskier tend to pay lower dividends.
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Table 1 Comparison between dividend-paying and non-paying companies, 2000–2003
Variable Mean Mean p values
(“paying”) (“non-paying”)
(group) (group)
Mean market-to-book ratio, 2000–2003 2.226 3.401 0.052
Mean returns on assets, 2000–2003 5.093 −4.566 0.000
Mean returns on equity, 2000–2003 10.893 −21.359 0.000
Mean capital gearing, 2000–2003 37.770 37.120 0.881
Beta coefficient 0.86 1.33 0.009
Mean price volatility, 2000–2003 24.740 38.250 0.000
Mean total assets, 2000–2003 (CHF, thousands) 4,643,377 1,484,523 0.108
Mean sales, 2000–2003 (CHF, thousands) 3,017,036 467,396 0.184
Mean foreign-owned share of capital, 2001–2003 8.08 15.42 0.081
Mean share of capital owned by institutions, 2001–2003 3.61 1.81 0.648
Share of capital owned by large shareholders, 2003 46.03 41.78 0.412
Share of voting rights for large shareholders, 2003 42.19 40.34 0.780
Ownership concentration does not seem to affect the option to pay dividends.
This conclusion holds whether one considers the share of voting rights or the
share of the equity owned by large shareholders (shareholders that have more
than 5% of a company’s voting rights and that are obliged to make their owner-
ship public under Swiss regulations). Two other aspects concerning ownership
seem to bemore closely related with the decision to pay dividends. Institutional
investors (investment companies and pension funds) held larger shares in div-
idend-paying companies, but overall the difference is not significant. (Pension
funds taken separately did show a clear preference for dividend-paying com-
panies, perhaps for regulatory reasons.) This finding is consistent with results
from previous papers, such as Grinstein and Michaely (2005). Dividend-paying
companies also had a lower foreign-owned share of capital.
Based on these results and a look at the overall sample, one can conclude
that companies that do not pay dividends tend to be either old companies,
established companies going through protracted difficulties, or – more often –
younger, smaller, and riskier companies.
4.2 Sources of cross-sectional variation
This section focuses on the relationship between payout ratios and the vari-
ables described above over the 2000–2003 period. It also presents separately
the results for the subsample of companies that had at least one dividend pay-
ment in one of the 4 years. As will be shown below, the relationship between
dividend payments and many of the selected variables is not always monotonic.
Results for previous years are also presented in order to check the persistence
of the relationships found for the more recent period. To avoid cluttering the
presentation, the largely similar findings using dividend yield (as alternative
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measure of dividend policy) are not reported. The more important differences
are discussed at the end of the section.
Table 2 shows that, for the whole set of firms, more profitable companies
have higher payout ratios. Taking into account just the group of companies
with positive dividend payments, however, the relationship is much weaker,
especially for returns on equity.
The fact that companies with higher price volatility and higher market-to-
book ratios have lower dividend yields and payout ratios supports the “matu-
rity hypothesis” of Grullon et al. (2002). “Younger” (smaller, riskier, growing)
companies pay less dividends than “older” ones. One could note, however, that
correlations with firm size are not significant in this sample; so one should be
careful in drawing the picture of the standard “life-cycle” of a firm. The results
concerning riskiness can also be related to Lintner’s (1956) finding that manag-
ers are reluctant to increase dividends if they are not sure that future earnings
will be stable enough to prevent dividend decreases.
Capital gearing is negatively correlated with the payout ratio. It may be
the case that highly levered firms find additional debt very expensive and try to
increase their retained earnings.Debt covenants also usually include restrictions
on dividend payments. It is interesting to note that in a US study, DeAngelo
et al.(2004) find a positive relationship between leverage and dividends. This
suggests that high dividends and high leverage are used together in the case
of companies with potential free cash flow problems. (One can also note that
Table 2 Payout ratios and firm characteristics
Variables Correlation Correlation Correlation – Correlation –
(averages “paying” “paying”
2000–2003) subsample subsample
(averages (2003)
2000–2003)
Market-to-book ratio −0.188*** −0.001 −0.114 −0.028
Returns on assets 0.337*** 0.419*** 0.266** 0.205**
Returns on equity 0.199** 0.332*** 0.006 −0.063
Sales 0.063 0.050 0.028 0.068
Total assets 0.067 0.066 0.033 0.076
Capital gearing −0.132 −0.176** −0.196** −0.238***
Price volatility −0.497*** −0.375*** −0.407*** −0.287***
Voting rights of large −0.004 −0.029 0.030 −0.016
shareholders (2003)
Capital share of −0.032 −0.011 −0.015 −0.068
large shareholders (2003)
Share of capital owned −0.096 −0.074 −0.121 −0.164
by families and employees
Foreign-owned share of capital −0.096 −0.014 0.194** 0.107
Share of capital owned by institutions −0.036 −0.094 −0.032 0.019
Dividend yield 0.633*** 0.537*** 0.418*** 0.367***
* Significant at the 10% level;
** Significant at the 5% level;
*** Significant at the 1% level
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dividend payments automatically increase leverage by reducing equity and total
assets.) The relationship found in the Swiss sample can be taken to suggest a
higher influence of debt covenants and the use of debt and dividends as substi-
tutes rather than complements in solving agency problems, as found in Johnson
(1995).
Dividend policy does not appear to be strongly affected by ownership struc-
ture. The relationship between ownership concentration (the share of capital
or voting rights owned by large shareholders) and dividend policy is inconclu-
sive (usually negative and insignificant for the payout ratio and positive and
insignificant for the dividend yield). As may be expected, there is a negative
correlation between the share of capital owned by families (and employees)
and the two measures of dividend policy – but the relationship is again not
significant. While foreign participation in companies that made no dividend
payments over the period was higher than in the dividend-paying companies,
within the latter group foreign investors seem to prefer companies with higher
payout ratios.
There is also a positive and significant relationship between dividend yields
and payout ratios. While the relationship is hardly surprising, it shows that one
of the reasons for higher dividend yields is that companies pay a higher share
of their earnings as dividends.
The simple analysis of correlations allows us to determine several factors
affecting dividend policy. These findings can be checked using regression analy-
sis. The multivariate results show that the variables outlined above explain part
of the variability in dividend policy across firms. Robust (White) residuals were
used to avoid heteroskedasticity problems.
Table 3 presents the main factors influencing payout ratios at three points in
time: 1993, 1998, and 2003. Payout ratios are regressed on lagged measures of
profitability, leverage, risk, size, growth opportunities, and ownership concen-
tration. The first 2 years are characterized by a growing economy and increas-
ing share prices (the more so for the second period) and thus complement the
picture provided by the more recent years of declining share prices and low
economic growth1. An important caveat is that going back towards the early
1990s reduces data availability and the sample size. Since reportingmajor share-
holdings has only been mandatory in Switzerland since 2002, the regression for
2003 is the only one that includes a measure of ownership concentration.
In all 3 years, profitability is positively associated with payout ratios. The
relationship is weaker during the periods of higher economic growth – when
growth opportunities are larger and the opportunity cost of dividends increases.
Leverage is negatively related to the payout ratio, just as the previous corre-
lation analysis suggested. The relationship is not significant for 1998, suggesting
that debt covenants are less likely to become binding during a period of higher
growth.
1 The author would like to thank an anonymous referee for emphasizing the importance of this
point
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Table 3 Factors influencing the payout ratio Dependent variable: payout ratio in 2003
Variables Coefficients (p values)
1993 1998 2003 2003
Constant 70.871 57.276 46.428 42.045
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
ROA(t−1) 0.710 0.301 0.511*** 0.558***
(0.115) (0.197) (0.004) (0.000)
Capital gearing (t−1) −0.519*** −0.176 −0.203* −0.202**
(0.007) (0.221) (0.081) (0.048)
Price volatility (t−1) −0.913** −0.394* −0.452* −0.381*
(0.022) (0.054) (0.076) (0.064)
Total assets (in billions; t−1) −0.280 0.020 0.220* 0.017***
(0.192) (0.859) (0.059) (0.009)
Market-to-book ratio (t−1) −0.913** −1.495* −0.662 −0.492
(0.022) (0.097) (0.176) (0.312)
Voting rights (large shareholders, 2003) −0.017
(0.835)
Adjusted R2 0.244 0.146 0.164 0.185
Number of observations 59 64 71 97
* Significant at the 10% level;
** Significant at the 5% level;
*** Significant at the 1% level
Price volatility and the market-to-book ratio both have a negative impact on
payout ratios, but the effect of the former seems to be stronger. The relationship
with firm size (proxied by total assets) is generally weak, except for the smaller
sample from 2003.
As expected from previous results, ownership concentration does not have
a significant influence on payout ratios. While the sign is indeed negative – the
work of La Porta et al. (2000), for instance, suggests such a relationship – the
relationship is extremely weak. This is confirmed by the results of Goergen et
al. (2003) for Germany.
Compared to payout ratios, dividend yields show a weaker relationship
with profitability and leverage. While price volatility is an important factor for
explaining payout ratios, it is even more so for dividend yields. These findings
are not surprising, since the dividend yield generally has a negative relation-
ship with growth opportunities. The relationship with the ownership measures
is again weak. The explanatory power of the analogous regressions for the
dividend yield is higher.
To summarize, more profitable, less risky, larger, less leveraged companies
with lower growth opportunities pay more dividends. Price volatility appears to
be a really important factor in the cross-sectional variation in dividend policy.
The explanation for this may be that when future earnings are uncertain, man-
agers are unwilling to commit to large cash payouts for the future. Dividend
policy seems to be surprisingly uniform across different ownership structures, a
finding which is quite interesting for a Swiss sample.
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4.3 A note on repurchases
A final point in the cross-sectional analysis concerns the relationship between
dividends and repurchases. Data on repurchasing activity are based on the
“Purchase of stock” item from Compustat.
It seems that, as in the American case, repurchases are becoming an increas-
ingly popular method to disburse cash to shareholders, although they seem to
still be less widespread in Switzerland (see also Dumont et al. 2004). However,
since the data for this subsection is rather sparse, the results should be inter-
preted with care. Table 4 presents the relationship between payout policy and
the profitability and price volatility of the companies in the sample. There are
four groups of firms: those that neither paid dividends nor repurchased shares
over the 2000–2002 period (16 companies), those that only repurchased shares
(4 companies), those that only paid dividends (73 companies), and those that
chose both types of payouts (15 companies).
While companies that did not pay any cash or just repurchased shares made
losses on average, companies that paid dividends had positive mean profits with
the most profitable group using both types of payments. Price volatility shows
the opposite pattern. The last column shows the p -values for the ANOVA test
for the equality of the means for the four groups. The results suggest that the
differences are significant.
There seem to be no significant differences in terms of ownership concentra-
tion and firm size between the four groups. Companies that did not pay any cash
had higher market-to-book ratios than those that paid dividends, but compa-
nies that only used repurchases had lower ratios (since the “repurchase-only”
subsample has just four companies, it is difficult to draw a definite conclusion
based on this result).
One can tentatively conclude that companies with stable positive earnings
generally choose dividends (with the most profitable and least risky companies
choosing both types of payment). Companies with low and volatile earnings
(and perhaps higher growth opportunities) choose to pay out no cash or to use
just repurchases. This pattern is in line with the findings of Jagannathan et al.
(2000), Guay and Harford (2000), and Fama and French (2001) for the USA.
Table 4 Dividends and repurchases
Variable No payment Repurchases Dividends Dividends and p value,
repurchases ANOVA test
ROA −15.603 −12.332 3.494 5.200 0.004
ROE −30.937 −13.552 6.087 10.506 0.002
Price volatility 35.408 35.442 23.393 19.067 0.003
The table presents the average levels of returns on assets, returns on equity and price volatility
over the 2000–2002 period for four groups of companies: those that did not repurchase shares and
did not pay dividends over the 3 years, those that only repurchased shares, those that only paid
dividends, and those that disbursed cash using both methods
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It confirms that there are significant differences between dividends and repur-
chases, and that there is more at work than the “substitution” process described
by Grullon and Michaely (2002).
5 The dynamic aspect: dividends and earnings
This part of the paper deals with variations in dividends over time. It focuses
on the relationship between dividends and earnings, and explores the reasons
for changes in dividends for a given company.
Brav et al.(2004) find in their survey of US financial executives that 40% of
them target dividends per share, 28% target dividend payout ratios, and 27%
target growth in dividends per share. Section 5.1 examines the importance of
dividend payout ratios based on the Lintner model. Section 5.2 then looks at
changes in dividends per share and their informational content.
5.1 The Lintner model and payout targets
As a general rule, dividend policy seems to be fairly stable over time. For
instance, adding lagged measures of the payout ratio or the dividend yield to
the regressions in the previous section shows that they are highly significant
and improves the explanatory power of the regressions by a large amount.
Lintner (1956) suggests that managers set targets concerning payout ratios and
adjust dividend payments in order to gradually reach that target. Under this
hypothesis, the target ratio (γ ) is given by
D∗t = γEt, (1)
and the adjustment equation is
Dt − Dt−1 = α + δ(D∗t − Dt−1) + ut, (2)
where Dt are dividends paid in year t, Et are earnings for the same year, and
D∗t is the desired level of dividends in year t.
Combining the two equations, the model proposed by Lintner can be written
as
Dt = α + β1Dt−1 + β2Et + ut. (3)
The change in dividends is thus modeled as a function of lagged dividends
and current earnings. Managers are supposed to have in mind a “target” pay-
out ratio, and they slowly adjust dividends in order to reach this target. The
adjustment is gradual since, as Lintner finds, managers want to make sure that
changes in earnings are lasting, and they will avoid making decisions that will
have to be reversed soon.
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Equation (3) is a partial adjustment model, which can be consistently esti-
mated by ordinary least squares. The target payout ratio is estimated as – β2/β1,
while the speed of adjustment is given by –β1.
Estimating the Lintner model requires data over a longer period of time.
As a result, the sample is reduced to 60 companies for the 1987–2003 period
(16 years). The results of estimating the partial adjustment model for each of
the companies are summarized in Table 5.
The mean target ratio is around one-third, while the median is around one-
fifth. The actual mean payment ratio for the companies in the sample is 30.99%,
while the median is 30.32%. Thus, estimated target payout ratios are close to
the actual ones, and the explanatory power of the model is high (the average
adjusted R2s are above 40%). There is no significant autocorrelation in any of
the regressions. Results are also quite similar if one looks at the 25 companies
that had data for the longer 1975–2003 period.
For all US companies with valid Compustat data, Brav et al. (2004) find
average payout ratios of 37, 17, and 8% for the 1950–1964, 1965–1983, and
1984–2002 periods, respectively. The mean speed of adjustment was 0.67, 0.4,
and 0.33 over the three successive intervals. (Lintner’s estimates suggest a target
payout ratio of around 50%.) Given the low explanatory power and the high
variability in terms of estimated target payout ratios, Brav et al. suggest that
the relationship suggested by Lintner may have grown weaker over time. It is
known that payout ratios have declined over time in the USA; Swiss data seem
to suggest a similar trend (the average payout ratio for the companies in the
sample decreased from 46.28% in 1987 to 25.11% in 2003). Moreover, while the
overall results look good on average for the Swiss sample, there is once again
considerable variability at the firm level. The model performs better for some
companies than for others. Adjusted R2s vary from a low of −0.09% to a high
of 99%. The bulk of the firms are, however, somewhere between 20 and 70%.
It is also important to note that out of the 60 Swiss companies in the sample,
only four stated in their annual report for 2003 that they target the payout ratio.
The range the four companies gave for the target was between 25 and 33%
- a number which is close to the estimated mean and median targets for the
sample. The partial adjustment model, however, did not perform well for three
out of the four companies. At least in the Swiss case, it seems that when the
management actually declares a formal target ratio, this is more a kind of signal
for future dividend policy rather than a description of current realizations.
To sum up, there seems to be evidence that payout ratios are relatively stable
over time or that they change gradually. The practice of formally targeting a
Table 5 Estimation results for the partial adjustment model for the payout ratio (60 companies,
1987–2003)
Speed of adjustment Target payout ratio Adjusted R2
Mean 0.66 0.33 0.43
Median 0.63 0.20 0.48
Standard deviation 0.40 0.52 0.26
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particular payout ratio, however, is not very widespread. Managers seem to
concentrate mainly on dividends per share, which is the focus of the following
section.
5.2 Dividends and past, current and future earnings
5.2.1 Empirical findings on the informational content of dividend changes
Many models suggest that dividends are costly signals of future profitability.
This can explain both why dividends are paid in spite of the tax advantage of
capital gains and why announcements of dividend increases are usually accom-
panied by positive share price reactions. As we have seen in section 2, however,
the empirical evidence about the signaling idea is quite mixed.
5.2.2 Dividend changes and earnings
This section examines the relationship between dividend changes and changes
in earnings. The year of the dividend change is defined as year 0; the previous
3 years are years −3 to −1; the following three are years 1 to 3. The sam-
ple is based on non-financial, non-utility Swiss companies for which data were
available for the period 1982–2003. The resulting sample contains 409 dividend
increases, 65 dividend decreases, 44 dividend omissions, as well as 117 cases in
which there was no dividend payment for the second consecutive year, 25 cases
when companies resumed dividend payments, and 271 cases when dividends
remained unchanged. Since dividend increases are by far the largest group,
they are analyzed both as a whole and separately for each quintile of dividend
changes. The changes in earnings for each group (as well as the changes in
several other variables) are compared to the changes for companies that kept
dividends constant – these companies form the “control group” in the study.
Comparisons to zero are also presented whenever they are relevant (to test, for
instance, whether earnings have remained flat between two periods).
Dividends are assigned to year t if they are declared in that particular year
(and paid from the net income of year t−1). The earnings and cash flow figures
are those reported for the year. Total assets for year t are as reported at the end
of the year. The change in dividends in computed as
D0/1 = D0 − D−1D−1 , (4)
where D0 are (split-adjusted) dividends per share announced in year 0, and
D−1 are dividends announced in year −1. If there was no dividend payment in
the previous year (the denominator is zero), two separate groups are created
for companies that resume payments and companies that continue not to pay
dividends.
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Table 6 presents the relationship between dividend changes and changes in
earnings per share between years 0 and 1 (all earnings indicators are normal-
ized by total assets per share at the end of year −1). One can see that dividend
changes do not appear to predict future earnings growth. Companies that have
increased dividends do not seem to grow faster; in fact, the mean and median
of their earnings increase are quite similar to that of companies that did not
pay dividends in either year. Results are quite similar if one takes the earnings
growth between years 0 and 3 or between years 1 and 3 (not reported). There
also seems to be no obvious connection between dividend changes and changes
in earnings between years−1 and 0 (“current changes”). Indeed, the only strong
Table 6 Dividend changes and future earnings changes
Type Mean Median p value, p value, p value, p value,
mean mean median median
compared compared compared compared
to 0 to the no to the no to the
change no change change
group subsample subsample
(Wilcoxon test) (χ2 test)
Omissions 0.06708 0.01208 0.1440 0.1413 0.0606 0.1858
Continued 0.00711 0.00692 0.3024 0.2138 0.0406 0.1504
omissions
Decreases 0.00346 0.00237 0.5556 0.4907 0.8892 0.8902
No change −0.00363 0.00187 0.4553
Increases
Q1 0.00999 0.00606 0.0278 0.1323 0.0625 0.0754
Q2 0.00916 0.00506 0.2853 0.2029 0.4047 0.1197
Q3 0.00309 0.00571 0.6636 0.4848 0.3138 0.1972
Q4 −0.00773 0.00058 0.1921 0.6629 0.2900 0.5266
Q5 −0.00680 0.00004 0.3293 0.7403 0.6490 0.4673
All increases 0.00157 0.00350 0.6006 0.3348 0.4747 0.3086
Resumed 0.00126 0.00449 0.9199 0.7651 0.8662 0.8344
payments
p value, median p value,
mean (Wilcoxon test) median (χ2 test)
Increases versus 0.8099 0.7640 0.5044
decreases
Increases versus 0.9804 0.6292 0.8368
resumed payments
Resumed payments 0.7141 0.2451 0.5086
versus continued
omissions
The table presents the relationship between changes in dividends per share and changes in earn-
ings per share between years 0 and 1, normalized by total assets per share at the end of year −1.
Observations are grouped according to the sign and size of the change in dividends per share: omis-
sions, continued omissions (when no dividends are paid following a dividend omission), renewed
payments, decreases, no change, and the quintiles of dividend increases. The mean and median
earnings changes for each group are then compared to zero and to their counterparts from the ‘no
change group
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result is that companies that do not pay dividends in both year −1 and year 0
exhibit higher current earnings growth.
This is troubling evidence for the idea that companies that increase divi-
dends do so in order to signal higher earnings growth in the future. Although
surprising, the result does confirm previous findings. In their study based on
US data, Benartzi, Michaely, and Thaler (1997) show that dividend changes are
connected with past and to some extent current earnings changes, but there is
no significant relationship with future movements in earnings.
A look at the Swiss data confirms the strong relationship between past earn-
ings and dividend changes. Table 7 shows that the different groups registered
markedly different earnings changes between years −2 and −1. (It is perhaps
Table 7 Dividend changes and past earnings changes
Type Mean Median p value, p value, p value, p value,
mean mean median median
compared compared compared compared
to 0 to the no to the to the
change no change no change
subsample subsample subsample
(Wilcoxon test) (χ2 test)
Omissions −0.03851 −0.00104 0.0228 0.0000 0.0001 0.0037
Continued 0.03245 0.00481 0.0247 0.0003 0.0002 0.0057
omissions
Decreases −0.10919 −0.00624 0.0013 0.0790 0.0332 0.0038
No change −0.00365 −0.00104 0.0510
Increases :
Q1 0.00611 0.00421 0.0235 0.0080 0.0000 0.0000
Q2 0.00308 0.00521 0.0791 0.0592 0.0000 0.0000
Q3 0.00946 0.00779 0.0000 0.0002 0.0000 0.0000
Q4 0.00964 0.00957 0.0028 0.0006 0.0000 0.0000
Q5 0.00296 0.01789 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
All increases 0.01161 0.00705 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Resumed 0.00174 0.01029 0.0759 0.0020 0.0005 0.0066
payments
p value, p value, median p value, median
mean (Wilcoxon test) (χ2 test)
Increases versus 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
decreases
Increases versus 0.3552 0.3101 0.1493
resumed payments
Resumed payments 0.6308 0.5486 0.1230
versus continued
omissions
The table presents the relationship between changes in dividends per share and changes in earnings
per share between years −2 and −1, normalized by total assets per share at the end of year −1.
Observations are grouped according to the sign and size of the change in dividends per share: omis-
sions, continued omissions (when no dividends are paid following a dividend omission), renewed
payments, decreases, no change, and the quintiles of dividend increases. The mean and median
earnings changes for each group are then compared to zero and to their counterparts from the ‘no
change’ group
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useful to keep in mind that earnings for year −1 actually belong to the same
annual report as dividends declared in year 0). Dividend decreases and omis-
sions are associated with significant earnings decreases. Dividend increases are
associated with earnings increases – and the median of the earnings changes
increases for each successive quintile. For the group of companies that do not
change their dividends, earnings actually decrease from year−2 to year−1. The
mean is significantly negative at a 5% level. One should be careful, however,
when interpreting the results of the mean tests, since most of the series used in
this section are far from being normal and outliers seem to be a problem. Thus,
non-parametric tests for the equality in medians should be more accurate and
are used throughout the section.
Companies that resume dividend payments also enjoy a significant increase
in earnings. The only “exception to the rule” are companies that did not pay
dividends in either year −1 or year 0 – the non-payment decision comes in spite
of a significant earnings increase.
To sum up, dividends seem to “predict” the past rather than the future. This
challenges the idea that dividend increases are good news because they are a
(costly) signal for faster subsequent earnings growth.
There may, however, be other mechanisms that make dividend changes good
or bad news. One possibility is that dividend changes become informative due
to managers’ reluctance to decrease dividends.
In his classical study, Lintner (1956) wrote that the dividend policy of his
time was characterized by “inertia and conservatism” and that “most manage-
ments sought to avoid making changes in their dividends that might have to
be reversed within a year or so”. Almost half a century later, Brav, Graham,
Harvey, and Michaely (2004) conducted a survey of 384 financial executives of
US firms and found that 94% of managers try to avoid reducing dividends (this
is the highest score in their survey); 88% agree that there are negative con-
sequences to reducing dividends, while 78% are reluctant to make a dividend
decision that might need to be reversed.
In their paper, Brav et al. (2004) also report that 90% of managers in their
sample say they smooth dividends. They conclude that themanagers’ perception
is that “there is notmuch reward in increasing dividends but there is perceived to
be a large penalty for reducing dividends.”Acasual look at the Swiss sample sug-
gests that this pattern is to be confirmed. Table 8 presents the dividend changes
in year 0 and the corresponding dividend changes in the previous and following
years. Dividend increases are gradual: about 60% of dividend increases are
associated with at least a previous or a following increase. When dividends are
omitted, there is no dividend payment in three quarters of the following years.
This persistence is confirmed by the data on years without dividend payments
following dividend omissions. Just like in studies based on US data, dividend
increases and years when dividends are not changed vastly outnumber years
with dividend decreases and omissions. This pattern can be associated with the
investors’ preference for successive small positive surprises and isolated large
negative surprises, as suggested by Shefrin and Statman (1984).
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Table 8 Dividend payments over successive years
Previous year Base year Next year
Dividend decreases: 4 Dividend omissions: 44 Continued omissions: 33
Resumed payments: 6 Resumed payments: 11
No change: 22
Dividend increases: 12
Dividend omissions: 33 No payments following Continued omissions: 93
Continued omissions: 84 omissions: 117 Resumed payments: 24
Dividend omissions: 6 Resumed payments: 25 Dividend omissions: 2
Continued omissions: 19 Dividend increases: 15
No change: 8
Dividend decreases: 10 Dividend decreases: 65 Dividend decreases: 10
No change: 20 No change: 23
Dividend increases: 23 Dividend increases: 17
Omissions: 5
Dividend decreases: 25 No change: 271 Dividend decreases: 22
No change: 115 No change: 121
Dividend increases: 105 Dividend increases: 103
Resumed payments: 6 Dividend omissions: 24
Dividend decreases: 22 Dividend increases: 409 Dividend decreases: 40
No change: 105 No change: 97
Dividend increases: 240 Dividend increases: 257
Resumed payments: 16 Dividend omissions: 15
Dividends may thus become informative about earnings in a way not envis-
aged in classical signaling models. Since managers want to avoid dividend de-
creases, they will only increase dividends when they are reasonably sure that
there has been a sustainable increase in earnings. They will also cut or omit div-
idends only when the firm’s earnings position has deteriorated considerably. As
a result, a dividend increase will follow a period of significant earnings growth
and confirm that the new, higher level of earnings is persistent. At the same
time, dividend decreases will follow a slowdown and confirm that the firm will
still be in a difficult position in the future. Indeed, although their study seriously
challenges the role of dividend changes as a signal for future earnings, Benartzi
et al.(1997) find that earnings are less likely to decrease following dividend
increases.
One way to check the validity of this hypothesis is to look at the difference
between the mean levels of earnings before and after the dividend change.
Table 9 presents the results of this comparison. One can see that dividend
increases are associated with significant positive shifts in the mean level of
earnings. This result is supported by the large majority of the significance tests
for each quintile of dividend increases. The difference between the sample of
firm-years with dividend decreases and the sample with dividend increases is
also quite significant. This result is all the more interesting since the dividend
increase group only shows significantly higher growth between years −3 and
–2, and −2 and −1 (between years −1 and 0, the difference is only significantly
larger for the Wilcoxon test). Thus, although the period of remarkable growth
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Table 9 Dividend changes and changes in average earnings
Type Mean Median p value, p value, p value, p value,
mean mean median median
compared compared compared compared
to 0 to the no to the no to the no
change change change
subsample subsample subsample
(Wilcoxon (χ2 test)
test)
Omissions: 44 0.01311 0.00898 0.2821 0.1159 0.4266 0.5001
Continued omissions: 117 0.06110 0.03114 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Decreases: 65 −0.00513−0.00483 0.3445 0.6794 0.2100 0.0726
No change: 271 −0.00208 0.00139 0.2492
Increases: Q1: 84 0.01201 0.00958 0.0702 0.0464 0.0488 0.0228
Q2: 80 0.00689 0.00840 0.1629 0.1834 0.1758 0.0389
Q3: 82 0.01647 0.01179 0.0137 0.0093 0.0095 0.0108
Q4: 81 0.01369 0.01534 0.0375 0.0027 0.0033 0.0078
Q5: 82 0.02025 0.00978 0.0481 0.0071 0.1882 0.2995
All increases: 409 0.01389 0.01132 0.0000 0.0009 0.0010 0.0097
Resumed payments: 25 0.04830 0.02785 0.1303 0.0005 0.0314 0.0599
p value, p value, p value,
mean median median (χ2 test)
(Wilcoxon test)
Increases versus 0.0219 0.0015 0.0000
decreases
Increases versus 0.0213 0.0274 0.0149
resumed payments
Resumed payments 0.6538 0.2024 0.8256
versus continued omissions
The table presents the relationship between changes in dividends per share and changes in average
earnings per share. The earnings indicator is computed as the difference between average earnings
per share over years 1 to 3 and the average earnings per share over years −3 to −1, normalized by
total assets per share at the end of year −1. Observations are grouped according to the sign and the
size of the change in dividends per share: omissions, continued omissions (when no dividends are
paid following a dividend omission), renewed payments, decreases, no change, and the quintiles of
dividend increases
is in the past, a dividend increase seems to guarantee that this growth will not
be reversed in the medium term.
The mean and median of the earnings change for the group of dividend
decreases are negative, and the χ2 test even suggests significance. However
(and although one may claim that insignificance is mainly due to the small size
of the subsample of dividend decreases), results do not strongly imply a shift for
the worse when dividends go down. Indeed, in the case of dividend omissions,
the mean and median are both positive, although the difference in earnings
is not significantly different from zero or from the change of the benchmark
constant dividend group.
Thus, the bad news contained in the dividend decrease may be that the
difficult times for the company will continue in the future and that the firm’s
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Table 10 Dividend changes and average earnings
p value, p value,
previous following
3 years 3 years
Dividend decreases Compared to no change Mean 0.8378 0.5972
Mean, Wilcoxon test 0.5279 0.1236
Median, χ2 test 0.2539 0.0726
Compared to increases Mean 0.0159 0.0009
Median, Wilcoxon test 0.0009 0.0000
Median, χ2 test 0.0008 0.0000
Dividend omissions Compared to no change Mean 0.0000 0.1655
Mean, Wilcoxon test 0.0000 0.0022
Median, χ2 test 0.0001 0.0012
Compared to increases Mean 0.0005 0.0000
Mean, Wilcoxon test 0.0000 0.0000
Median, χ2 test 0.0000 0.0000
Continued omissions Compared to no change Mean 0.0000 0.3383
Mean, Wilcoxon test 0.0000 0.0003
Median, χ2 test 0.0000 0.0000
Compared to increases Mean 0.0000 0.0000
Mean, Wilcoxon test 0.0000 0.0000
Median, χ2 test 0.0000 0.0000
The table presents the relationship between dividend changes and average earnings levels before
and after the change. The measure for the previous average earnings is computed as the ratio
between the sum of earnings per share for years −3 to −1 divided by total assets per share at the
end of year −1. The measure for the future average earnings uses the average earnings per share
for years 1–3
management is no longer able to “smooth” dividends.One can look at the profit-
ability of these companies and compare it to that of the other firms. Table 10
shows that profitability is indeed lower for companies that decrease, omit, or
continue not to pay dividends. It also seems that the gap becomes wider over
time for dividend decreases. While the comparison is a rough one given the
overlap between the earnings observations, it does suggest a striking pattern.
(Moreover, the problem of overlap is more likely to blur differences between
observations rather than increase them).
Therefore dividend decreases, omissions, and continued non-payments are a
sign that bad times will continue for the company. There may be even a slight
worsening of the firm’s position in the case of dividend decreases.
5.2.3 Dividend changes and cash flows
It has been argued that earnings numbers are less reliable for Switzerland than
for the USA. This may affect the accuracy of the results presented above. One
can try to use cash flows as an alternative indicator of firm performance. Cash
flow numbers are more difficult to “manage” than accounting earnings, and
they are also less likely to be manipulated than “headline” measures such as
earnings per share.Moreover, if managers aremainly concerned with their abil-
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ity to honor their commitment for regular cash outlays, cash flows may be more
important than accounting earnings.
The results using cash flows are quite similar to those based on earnings per
share. Dividend increases are associated with strong past growth in cash flows;
cash flow changes remain positive between years −1 and 0, and 0 and 1, but the
growth is not significantly higher than that of the control group. The mean and
median of cash flow changes between years −2 and −1 for the group of divi-
dend decreases are both negative. Moreover, companies that decrease, omit, or
continue not to pay dividends generate significantly less cash relative to their
total assets, and the gap becomes slightly wider after the dividend change (not
Table 11 Dividend changes and changes in average cash flows
Type Mean Median p value, p value, p value, p value,
mean mean median median
compared compared compared compared
to 0 to the to the to the
no change no change no change
subsamplesubsample subsample
(Wilcoxon (χ2 test)
test)
Omissions 0.00119−0.00509 0.9384 0.9544 0.3120 0.3408
Continued omissions 0.02260 0.01760 0.1014 0.0451 0.0018 0.0600
Decreases −0.00101−0.00085 0.8600 0.8660 0.3559 0.4898
No change 0.00050 0.00524 0.9037
Increases
Q1 0.01166 0.01584 0.0000 0.2144 0.0093 0.0754
Q2 0.01849 0.02327 0.0006 0.0291 0.0022 0.0047
Q3 0.02826 0.26605 0.0000 0.0007 0.0000 0.0001
Q4 0.01925 0.02519 0.0042 0.0027 0.0012 0.0006
Q5 0.03022 0.01321 0.0061 0.0021 0.0082 0.2995
All increases 0.02153 0.02053 0.0000 0.0001 0.0000 0.0000
Resumed payments 0.05772 0.03228 0.0389 0.0005 0.0158 0.1434
p value, p value, p value,
mean median (Wilcoxon test) median (χ2 test)
Increases versus 0.0119 0.0002 0.0001
decreases
Increases versus 0.0254 0.4068 0.5365
resumed payments
Resumed payments 0.3013 0.6918 0.8256
Versus
continued omissions
Increases versus 0.0814 0.0026 0.0116
Omissions
The table presents the relationship between changes in dividends per share between year 0 and year
1 and average cash flows. The cash flow indicator is computed as the difference between average
cash flows per share over years 1 to 3 and −3 to −1, normalized by total assets per share at the end
of year −1. Observations are grouped according to the sign and size of the change in dividends per
share: omissions, continued omissions (when no dividends are paid following a dividend omission),
renewed payments, decreases, no change, and the quintiles of dividend increases. The mean and
median earnings ratios for each group are then compared to zero and to their counterparts from
the “no change” group
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Table 12 Dividend changes and changes in average capital expenditures
Type Mean Median p value, p value, p value, p value,
mean mean median median
compared compared compared compared
to 0 to the to the to the
no change no change no change
subsample subsample subsample
(Wilcoxon (χ2 test)
test)
Omissions: 33 −0.02728−0.01174 0.1309 0.0868 0.0613 0.0385
Continued omissions: 82−0.06295−0.00970 0.0081 0.0005 0.0009 0.0018
Decreases: 52 −0.00636−0.00932 0.4147 0.8899 0.0468 0.0315
No change: 197 −0.00505 0.00423 0.2526
All increases: 342 0.00851 0.00630 0.0001 0.0021 0.0168 0.5529
Resumed payments: 17 0.01172 0.00635 0.0385 0.2677 0.1928 0.4482
p value, p value, p value,
mean median median (χ2 test)
(Wilcoxon test)
Increases versus 0.0185 0.0002 0.0029
decreases
Increases versus 0.7411 0.7987 0.8129
resumed payments
Resumed payments 0.1479 0.0028 0.0029
versus
continued omissions
Increases versus 0.0001 0.0010 0.0021
Omissions
The table presents the relationship between changes in dividends per share between year 0 and year
1 and changes in capital expenditures per share. The change in capital expenditures is computed
as the difference between average capital expenditures per share in years 1 to 3 and −3 to −1,
normalized by total assets per share at the end of year −1. Observations are grouped according to
the sign and size of the change in dividends per share: omissions, continued omissions (when no
dividends are paid following a dividend omission), renewed payments, decreases, no change, and
the quintiles of dividend increases.
reported). Table 11 shows the shift in average cash flows between years −3 to
−1 and 1 to 3. Results are at least as strong as those based on earnings. It can also
be noted that the performance of companies omitting dividends seems worse
if one uses cash flow numbers rather than earnings numbers. There may be an
element of earnings management here – the dip in reported earnings between
years −2 and −1 is higher, making the future rebound more significant. As a
result, there will be larger but isolated negative earnings changes and small but
frequent positive earnings news, as suggested by Shefrin and Statman (1984).
The evidence is, however, not very strong and this conclusion must remain
tentative.
5.2.4 Dividend Changes and Capital Expenditures
It is also interesting to look at the changes in capital expenditures around
dividend changes. For instance, if companies generate large cash flows (as it
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seems to be the case before dividend increases), larger dividends may be an
instrument used to reduce or prevent overinvestment. Table 12 shows that cap-
ital expenditures increase following dividend increases. At the same time, the
capital expenditures of companies that keep dividends constant are basically
flat, while the capital expenditures of companies that omit or continue not to
pay dividends decrease significantly. For the group of companies that decrease
dividends, the mean and median for the change in capital expenditures are
negative, and the median tests suggest this result is significant. Thus a positive
(negative) change in dividends seems to be associated with a positive (negative)
change in capital expenditures. (This comparison uses a slightly smaller sample
because of limited data availability. The missing observations do not seem to
be concentrated in any of the dividend change categories and they are unlikely
to affect results.)
By having a closer look at the data, one can also see that companies that
declared and paid lower dividends in year 0 had significantly lower capital
expenditures in year −1 compared to year −2. Companies that decreased divi-
dends also seem to have done worse, although the difference is not significant.
Companies that increased dividends are basically undistinguishable from the
control group. Similar results hold for changes in capital expenditures between
years −3 and −2 (the actual numbers are available upon request).
An additional interesting result is that, in a probit regression explaining div-
idend cuts, a dummy variable for losses has explanatory power over and above
that of the relative level of earnings or the earnings changes. These results
(available upon request) are in line with the findings of DeAngelo et al. (1992)
for a sample of US firms and those of Goergen et al. (2003) for a sample of
German firms. The authors confirm the managers’ reluctance to cut dividends
– a loss is largely a “necessary” condition for dividend cuts.
To summarize the findings of this section, it seems that dividends are in-
creased following sustained growth in terms of earnings and cash flows. While
the future performance of dividend-increasing companies is not as impressive,
earnings and cash flow remain at a comparatively high level over the medium
term. Companies that decrease or omit dividends show a different pattern.
Their initial position in terms of their accounting profitability or their capacity
to generate cash flows is worse. For companies that omit dividends there is only
weak evidence of a limited earnings and cash flow rebound, while for dividend
decreases the evolution is slightly negative. Companies that continue not to
pay dividends do show some improvement, but the situation of all three groups
remains worse than that of dividend- increasing companies over the medium
term. Moreover, dividend omissions follow 2 years of sustained reductions in
capital expenditures. Years with dividend decreases and zero dividend pay-
ments are followed by years with significantly lower capital outlays. Overall,
dividend increases seem to be gradual and much more frequent than dividend
decreases and omissions. Inmost cases, companies that omit dividends continue
not paying over the following years.
All these elements seem to suggest that managers are averse to dividend cuts,
and that they only increase dividends when they are sure that the firm’s position
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has improved in a sustainable way. Thus dividend changes become informative
for the future: dividend increases show that the positive past performance will
not be reversed over the medium term, and dividend decreases and cuts con-
firm a relatively poor performance during the following years. This mechanism
is to some extent related to the model of Fudenberg and Tirole (1996) who
show that when managers are risk-averse and more recent information is more
important in assessing their performance, the result will be earnings smoothing.
When dividends are introduced in the model, both earnings and dividends are
smoothed and both contain information.
5.2.5 Alternative explanations
Agency theory suggests that dividend increases can be used as a way to force
managers to distribute idle cash and avoid overinvestment. Thus the fact that
dividends increase for cash-rich companies (dividend increases are associated
with higher cash flows and cash levels before the dividend change, not reported)
should not come as a surprise.
Other evidence, however, tends to qualify the agency explanation. Capital
expenditures increase following dividend increases, and decrease following divi-
dend decreases and omissions compared to the previous average (This is in line
with the findings of Yoon and Starks 1995 and Denis et al. 1994). Moreover,
companies that increase dividends have not had significantly higher increases
in capital expenditure over the previous 2 years, while companies that omit
dividends show a significant slowdown over the same period. Thus, dividend
increases do not follow an investment boom, while dividend cuts and omis-
sions are not associated with subsequent higher investment that may indicate
better growth opportunities. Cash flows and cash levels for dividend-increasing
companies remain at a high level and even increase over the medium term.
All this does not mean that agency considerations do not seem to play a role.
It may be that dividend increases play a preventive role: given the persistent
high cash flows generated by the company and the higher level of future capital
expenditure, dividend increases could be used as a way to force managers to
keep up the firm’s performance in the future. Indeed, this pressure may explain
why dividend increases happen at all if one accepts the idea of managers’ reluc-
tance to commit to higher payments.
The fact that capital expenditures decrease significantly following dividend
omissions and dividend decreases is quite striking. Dividends do not seem to
be cut in order to take advantage of new and significant growth opportunities.
One may think instead that these firms are constrained and are unable to sus-
tain investment on the previous scale. This may be because external funds are
expensive. Fama and French (2001) mention the “pecking order theory” when
analyzing the evolution of dividend policy in the USA over the last decades.
Using Italian data, Sembenelli (1993) finds that dividends are increased slowly,
over several years,while dividend cuts tend tobemuchmoreabrupt.Heexplains
this in terms of “financial hierarchy”. External funds are expensive, and thus
firms will only increase dividends at a moderate pace in order to build financial
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slack. At the same time, they will decrease dividends quickly in order to avoid
cutting investment or losing favorable growth opportunities.
The fact that this relationship can be found based on Swiss data is interest-
ing. Indeed, many authors have claimed that bank-dominated financial systems,
such as those in continental Europe or in Japan, allow for a better provision of
funds for companies as a result of close long-term relationships between finan-
cial intermediaries and their customers. In particular, banks in these countries
are supposed to help reduce the costs of financial distress by providing liquidity
(see for instance Kashyap et al. 1990). While this is a widespread view, there are
authors who have challenged this view and argued that the positive role of bank
relationships in these countries is overstated. An example in this direction is the
comprehensive study of Edwards and Fischer (1996) on the German financial
system. The findings in this paper may be taken to suggest that firms that cut
dividends are constrained and that they cannot readily access external funds.
There are, however, some caveats that should prevent one from looking
at the findings in a pure “pecking order” perspective. First, companies that
decrease or omit dividends seem to have done rather poorly over the previous
years, and it is doubtful whether they have many valuable investment oppor-
tunities. Thus, the lack of support from financial intermediaries may simply
be the result of a straightforward decision without too much impact from fac-
tors such as asymmetric information. The data also do not fully support the
“financial hierarchy” scenario of Sembenelli (1993): when companies omit div-
idends, they have already lowered their capital expenditures over the previous
2 years. Instead of abruptly cutting dividends in order to benefit from valuable
investment opportunities, it seems that managers are willing to forego capital
expenditures rather than cut dividends. This is in agreement with the results in
the survey of Brav et al. (2004), who show that most managers consider main-
taining the dividend level at least as important as investment decisions. Thus,
while a “pecking order” phenomenon may be part of the story, it is not the
whole story.
Grullon et al. (2002) put forward the “maturity hypothesis”. They find that
the good news contained in dividend increases is not that earnings will increase
faster in the future, but that a systematic decrease will be significantly lower.
Thus, while profitability declines following a dividend increase, the decrease
in risk more than makes up for it. The situation is symmetric for dividend de-
creases: while there is a profitability rebound, there is also a significant increase
in risk. They then argue that dividend increases may be a sign of “firm matu-
rity”: as a firm becomes mature, that is, it is less risky and has fewer growth
opportunities, it will naturally disburse more cash to its shareholders.
Again, the fact that capital expenditures rise following dividend increases
does not fit the “maturity” explanation. Additionally, one may note that the
maturity hypothesis does not provide a clear intuition for the meaning of divi-
dend decreases.
At a more basic level, the findings in this paper and those of Grullon, and
Swaminathan are not contradictory. If dividend increases are a sign of lower
risk, it is also less likely that the previous good performance of the firm will
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be reversed in the near future - that is, that the mean of future earnings will
be lower. Benartzi et al. (1997) also find that companies that increase their
dividends are less likely to experience earnings decreases. One can indeed note
that “one interesting issue” Brav et al. (2004) find in their interviews “is that
some mangers view their information conveyance as being about the mean of
the distribution of future earnings, while others believe that information con-
veyance primarily helps resolve uncertainty and so is about the second moment
of the distribution.“
The pattern of dividend increases and decreases (as well as that of earnings
changes) can also be interpreted as a sign that managers try to present their
company in a light that makes it attractive to investors’ preferences, as pre-
sented in Shefrin and Statman (1984). After all, dividends and earnings per
share are the most visible numbers, at least for small individual shareholders.
The recent “catering theory” of Baker andWurgler (2004) shows that managers
are indeed sensitive to investor preferences.
Finally, one should keep in mind that the fact that dividend increases are not
a harbinger of faster earnings growth does not necessarily condemn the signal-
ing idea. Since the standard signaling models are usually two-period models,
one cannot distinguish between faster earnings growth and higher future earn-
ings levels. Indeed, since dividends are usually seen as a signal for permanent
earnings, taking averages over several years may actually give a better approx-
imation of permanent earnings. Thus some signaling may also be part of the
explanation for dividend changes – albeit not the entire story.
6 Conclusions
Thepaper has examined several features of dividendpolicy for a sample of Swiss
companies. Cross-sectional comparisons show negative relationships between
dividend payments and market-to-book ratios, price volatility, and leverage,
as well as positive relationships with profitability and (to a lesser extent) firm
size and institutional holdings. Ownership concentration does not seem to have
significant effects. Companies that used repurchases over the recent years were
riskier and less profitable than companies choosing dividends. While some of
these relationships are expectable, the negative relationship between leverage
and dividend payments, the weak influence of ownership structure, the strong
influence of price volatility, and the contrast between dividends and repurchases
are not obvious results in the light of theory and previous empirical studies and
thus are important aspects to note.
The analysis of dividend decisions over time shows that the classical Lintner
model of partial adjustment has a rather mixed performance. A look at changes
in dividends per share – the measure that is usually given pride of place in
annual reports – reveals interesting patterns, however.
Signaling models suggest that dividend changes predict future profitability.
Still, the analysis of the data indicates that when dividends increase, earn-
Dividend policy in Switzerland 181
ings have already increased. There are no obvious signs of faster growth after
positive changes in dividends.
Nonetheless, there is evidence that when dividends increase, future average
earnings will be at a higher level compared to the past. Companies that decrease
or omit dividends have been in a difficult position for several years, and they
will still have inferior cash flows and earnings over the medium term. They will
also have significantly lower capital expenditures.
These findings suggest that dividend changes can become informative due
to the manager’s asymmetric perception of rewards for dividend increases and
negative consequences of dividend cuts. Sincemanagers try to avoid cutting div-
idends until they “have to”, and only increase them when they think earnings
are sufficient, dividend increases show that earnings have shifted to a higher
level over the medium term, while dividend decreases are a sign that the firm’s
problems are likely to continue in the following years.
This mechanism can also explain why price volatility is such an important
factor in the cross-sectional comparisons. If price volatility is taken to be a sign
of uncertainty concerning future earnings, then its strong negative relationship
with dividends may mean that managers try to keep dividends at a low level
in order to avoid having to cut them in low earnings states. Thus, dividend
changes can actually be informative, although the mechanism may be different
from that considered in classical signaling models. Exploring this hypothesis
over larger samples, and perhaps for other countries with different regulatory
environments, can be an interesting area for future research.
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